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SHANGHAI — At the heart of the intensifying trade dispute between the United States and China is a fundamental question: Which country is more willing to endure short-term pain for the long-term gain of playing a leading role in high-tech industries.
上海——处于美国与中国之间不断加剧的贸易争端核心的，是一个根本性的问题：哪个国家更愿意承受短期痛苦，以换取在高技术产业起主导作用的长期利益。
China has embarked on an aggressive and expensive plan to retool its economy for the future as it moves to dominate in robotics, aerospace, artificial intelligence and more. President Trump has said China’s approach relies on unfair and predatory practices, and on stolen American technology. And even as Chinese leaders say they want to avoid a trade war, they are staunchly defending their plans and showing little sign of backing down.
中国为了重组经济，已经开始实施一项雄心勃勃、耗资巨大的计划，力图在机器人、航空航天、人工智能以及更多其他领域占据主导地位。特朗普总统曾说，中国的做法依赖于不公平和掠夺性的手段，还依赖于窃取美国的技术。尽管中国领导人说，他们希望避免一场贸易战，但他们依然在坚定地捍卫着自己的计划，几乎没有一点退让的迹象。
Mr. Trump’s threat to sharply escalate the administration’s tariffs on Chinese imports — a threat he reiterated on Friday — shows that neither side has yet gone far enough to persuade the other to compromise. Bigger and broader tariffs may be necessary to get China’s attention.
特朗普威胁要大幅提高美国政府对中国进口商品征收的关税，他在上周五重申了这个威胁。这表明，双方都没有做出足够大的努力来说服对方妥协。要吸引中国的注意，也许需要征收更多、更广泛的关税。
“The administration, if it’s serious, better be prepared for much more,” said Derek Scissors, resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute.
“政府最好有准备征收更多的关税，如果它是认真对待这个问题的话，”美国企业研究所(American Enterprise Institute)常驻学者史剑道(Derek Scissors)说。
China’s $300 billion plan for government assistance, Made in China 2025, calls for helping cutting-edge industries by providing low-interest loans from state-controlled banks, guaranteeing large market shares in China and offering extensive research subsidies. The goal is to help Chinese firms acquire Western competitors, develop advanced technology and construct immense factories with considerable economies of scale.
中国的3000亿美元的政府扶植计划《中国制造2025》呼吁为前沿行业提供帮助，包括通过国有银行提供低息贷款，在国内保证大的市场份额，以及提供大量研究补贴。这个计划的目标是帮助中国企业收购西方竞争对手，开发先进技术，建设规模可观的巨型工厂。
It is an agenda that China would probably go to great lengths to protect. “We will not start a war — however, if someone starts a war, we will definitely fight back,” Gao Feng, the commerce ministry spokesman, said at a news conference in Beijing on Friday. “No options will be ruled out.”
这是一个中国可能会竭尽全力去保护的行动计划。“我们不会挑事，但如果有人挑事，我们会坚决应战，”中国商务部发言人高峰周五在北京的新闻发布会上说。“我们不排除任何选项。”
For the United States, victory in such a war would be difficult to verify, much less achieve.
对于美国来说，在这样一场战争中，什么算胜利难以核实，更不用说获得胜利了。
China could say it plans to ease back on government support. But that could be difficult to quantify because of the country’s opaque political system and the state’s control of information.
中国可能会说，它计划减少政府的资助。但是，由于中国不透明的政治体制和国家对信息的控制，很难对此进行量化。
China could back off from rules that favor local competitors and require American companies to share technology if they want access to the Chinese market. For example, foreign automakers face pressure to transfer electric-car technology to their local partners, and foreign technology companies are increasingly required to submit to security reviews. Foreign businesses have long complained that many of the rules they must follow are unwritten.
中国可能会放松有利于本国竞争者、要求美国公司如果想进入中国市场就必须共享技术的规则。比如，外国汽车制造商面临着将电动汽车技术转让给当地合作伙伴的压力，外国技术公司还越来越多地被要求接受安全审查。外国企业长期以来一直抱怨，他们必须遵守许多不成文的规则。
China’s government-financed campaign is already paying off in some ways. Drive into downtown Shanghai from Pudong International Airport and you pass a seemingly endless series of huge hangars and vast, glass-walled design centers, all part of the country’s effort to create a commercial aircraft manufacturing giant to rival Boeing or Airbus. Travel to factory districts in Shanghai and on the outskirts of many other Chinese cities and you see enormous, newly built factories ready to churn out electric cars, the batteries they use and other components.
中国政府提供资金的有计划的活动在某些方面已经取得了成效。从浦东国际机场开车前往上海市区，你会经过一连串看上去无止境的巨型飞机库，以及外面是巨大玻璃幕墙的设计中心，这是中国为与波音(Boeing)或空客(Airbus)竞争，创造一个商用飞机制造巨头努力的一部分。如果你前往上海工业园，或者去中国许多其他城市的郊区旅行，你会看到巨大的新建工厂，它们在准备批量生产电动汽车、电动汽车使用的电池，以及其他零部件。
Proving that the Chinese government unfairly supports the effort could be difficult, however.
然而，要证明中国政府不公平地支持这种努力，可能会十分困难。
The United States could press its argument with the World Trade Organization, which oversees global trading rules and prohibits big loans from government-controlled banks at artificially low interest rates. But the W.T.O. requires many contracts and government documents to prove cases, evidence that can be hard to get in a tightly controlled country like China.
美国可以向世界贸易组织(World Trade Organization)投诉，世贸组织负责监管全球贸易规则，并禁止政府控制的银行以人为压低的利率发放大额贷款。但是，世贸组织需要大量合同和政府文件来证明案子成立；而在像中国这样的政府严格控制的国家，得到这些证据很难。
Even when the W.T.O. rules against China, persuading the country to comply can be challenging. One such ruling, involving China’s restrictions on foreign electronic payment systems, was issued nearly six years ago. China is still mulling how it will comply — despite numerous complaints from the Obama administration and more recent nudges from the Trump administration.
即使世贸组织作出对中国不利的裁决，说服中国服从裁决也是一个挑战。一项涉及中国对外国电子支付系统进行限制的裁决是将近六年前做出的。中国仍在考虑如何遵守裁决——尽管奥巴马政府曾多次抱怨，尽管特朗普政府最近仍在慢慢做工作。
So the United States has turned to tariffs. That means it is using a 1980s tool to address an industrial policy issue that is already shaping the 21st century.
于是，美国转向了关税。这意味着，美国在使用一种20世纪80年代的工具，来解决一个已经在影响21世纪的产业政策问题。
Mr. Trump’s top trade official, Robert Lighthizer, was a deputy United States trade representative under President Ronald Reagan. The tariffs that Mr. Lighthizer threatened against Japan in those days are among the same ones he is wielding now. But the two periods differ in two big ways.
特朗普的高级贸易官员罗伯特·莱特希泽(Robert Lighthizer)曾在罗纳德·里根(Ronald Reagan)总统手下担任美国副贸易代表。莱特希泽在那些日子里用来威胁日本的关税与他现在正在使用的一样。但是，这两个时期在两方面有很大的不同。
One is that Japan depended on the United States in the ’80s for military protection from the Soviet Union. China, by contrast, is an increasingly assertive global rival, sending naval vessels to the Baltic Sea and building a naval base in East Africa.
一是日本在20世纪80年代依靠美国的军事保护来抵御苏联。与日本不同，中国是一个日益自信的、与美国在全球竞争的对手，中国派海军舰艇前往波罗的海，还在东非建立海军基地。
The second major difference between then and now is that the European Union deeply resented the tariffs of the 1980s, and Mr. Trump’s use of them could make it difficult to persuade European officials to present a united front. In response to American tariffs, Beijing could simply shift business from American companies like Boeing and Ford to European rivals like Airbus and Daimler.
那时和现在的第二个主要区别是，欧盟对上世纪80年代的关税深感不满，特朗普再次使用这些关税可能会使说服欧洲官员团结一致应对中国变得困难。作为对美国关税的回应，中国政府可以轻而易举地把与波音和福特(Ford)等美国公司的交易转移到空中客车和戴姆勒(Daimler)等欧洲竞争对手那里去。
Chinese officials dispute the American accusations about their unfair trade practices. They say Mr. Trump’s tariffs violate W.T.O. rules, and they dispute claims that China forces American companies to hand over technology. As for Made in China 2025, Chinese officials say the plan is only guidance, not a government directive — and that foreign companies are free to participate, too.
中国官员对于美国对中国不公平贸易行为的指责有争议。他们说特朗普的关税违反了世贸组织的规则，他们还对中国强迫美国公司交出技术的说法表示异议。至于《中国制造2025》，中国官员称，该计划只是指南，不是政府指令，外国公司也可以自由参与。
In China’s current industrial policy, the Trump administration sees an extension of how the country has already come to dominate one major industry of the future: solar power.
在中国现行的产业政策中，特朗普政府看到了中国一种做法的延伸，这种做法已经让中国开始主导一个未来重要产业：太阳能。
Mr. Trump himself is no fan of solar panels. He has spoken enthusiastically about coal, not renewable energy, throughout his campaign and his presidency. But the solar power industry is one of the biggest success stories so far in China’s efforts involving advanced industries.
特朗普本人不喜欢太阳能组件。在竞选总统和担任总统期间，他兴致勃勃地谈论煤炭，而不是可再生能源。但太阳能产业是迄今为止中国在涉及先进产业的努力中最大的成功案例之一。
The United States played a central role in developing solar panels and manufacturing them until a decade ago. Around then, the Chinese government decided to finance a lavish expansion of the sector. State-controlled banks lent tens of billions of dollars at low interest rates despite the high-profile bankruptcies of solar manufacturers.
直到十年前，美国在开发和制造太阳能组件方面一直起核心作用。差不多在十年前，中国政府决定为该行业的大规模扩张提供资金。虽然太阳能制造商在令人瞠目地破产，政府控股的银行仍为它们提供数百亿美元的低息贷款。
Chinese firms now produce three-quarters of the world’s solar panels. Most American and European companies have closed factories, and many have become insolvent. China’s success in producing solar panels has given Beijing a blueprint for seizing the lead in a long list of other high-tech industries.
中国公司如今生产世界上四分之三的太阳能组件。大多数美国和欧洲的公司都关门了，许多公司已经没有能力偿还债务。中国在太阳能组件生产方面的成功，为北京在其他高技术产业中占据领先地位提供了蓝图。
Many foreign companies are caught between China’s industrial ambitions and Washington’s efforts to stop them, including major aerospace companies and carmakers. The conflict may spread: Made in China 2025 could create major competitors to General Electric and Intel, and to companies outside the United States like Siemens and Samsung.
包括大型航空公司和汽车制造商在内的许多外国公司，被夹在了中国的工业野心和华盛顿阻止这种野心的努力之间。这场冲突有可能会蔓延：《中国制造2025》可能会给通用电气(General Electric)和英特尔(Intel)制造主要的竞争对手，也可能会给西门子(Siemens)和三星(Samsung)等美国以外的公司制造竞争对手。
Tariffs could hurt such companies if the United States and China follow through on their plans. They also risk losing their competitiveness if Beijing succeeds in subsidizing the creation of large Chinese rivals in their industries.
如果美国和中国把他们的计划付诸实施，关税可能会让这些公司受到损害。如果北京在它们的行业中通过补贴制造出国内的大型竞争对手，这些公司也可能失去它们的竞争力。
Boeing, for example, could be hit by American tariffs on civilian aircraft parts it buys from Avic, a state-controlled Chinese military and aviation company — required purchases if the company, which is based in Chicago, wants to sell planes in China. China, in turn, is pushing a consortium that includes Avic to become a Boeing rival. Boeing, like other multinational companies, has refrained from endorsing or criticizing the tariffs.
比如，波音可能会在从中国政府控制的中国航空工业集团有限公司（简称“航空工业”）购买民用飞机部件时，受到美国关税的打击。如果这家总部位于芝加哥的公司希望把飞机卖给中国，就必须从航空工业购买零部件；而中国也正在推动一个包括航空工业在内的联合企业，成为波音的竞争对手。与其他跨国公司一样，波音对征收关税不置可否。
“Although our members are unhappy with retaliatory tariffs being used,” said Kenneth Jarrett, the president of the American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai, “there is a belief that greater pressure has to be brought to bear on China.”
“尽管我们的成员对报复性关税的使用感到不满，”上海美国商会(American Chamber of Commerce)会长季瑞达(Kenneth Jarrett)说，“但有一种观念认为，必须对中国施加更大的压力。”
