评论
打印
When the Rawalpindi was sunk in November 1939, the Admiralty were unable to discover even the class of ship responsible.
当1939年11月拉尔瓦第号被击沉时，海军甚至无法知道敌舰是什么级别的。
And as for signals, not only were the Enigma-enciphered messages indecipherable, but the German Navy went over to wartime wireless procedure shortly before the attack on Poland,
至于信号，不仅无法破解谜机的信号，而且德国海军在进击波兰之前不久，部署了战时无线电程序，
putting an end to the possibility of following its movements by correlating call-signs with the results of direction-finding,
无法再利用他们的呼叫信号来跟踪他们的行动了。
and it was to be months before work on the German naval signals system at GC and CS and in the OIC…
政密学校和作战情报中心对德国海军信号系统进行了几个月的研究……
made it possible to produce even tentative deductions on the basis of Traffic Analysis.
推导了一些结果。
The first step was to distinguish U-boat from other German naval communications, and it is some indication of the extent of the black-out that this elementary advance was not made until the end of 1939.
第一步是将U型潜艇和其它的通信系统区分开，这项基本的工作直到1939年末才完成。
Until the outbreak of war, 'the naval sub-section of the German Section' of GC and CS 'which was started with one officer and a clerk as late as May 1938, still had no cryptanalysts.'
直到战争爆发，政密学校的对德事务部海军司还只有一名官员和一名员工，直至1938年5月，连一个密码专家都没有。
It was just one aspect of the failure even to try to meet the German challenge.
这只是在与德国的较量中失败的一个方面。
The prospects were better now, with the help of the Poles and with Bombes on the way, but the overall picture was dire:
这些情况现在波兰人和炸弹机的帮助下，现在有所改善，但全景仍然不容乐观：
