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It was not a good omen. In March, Chinese premier Li Keqiang confirmed that his government would authorise debt-for-equity swaps to reduce corporate indebtedness. A few weeks later, Huarong Energy announced that a dozen banks had agreed to swap loans totalling Rmb12.9bn ($1.9bn) for shares in the distressed shipbuilder-turned-oil exploration company.
当时那不是个好兆头：3月，中国总理李克强证实，中国政府将允许通过债转股来降低企业的负债率。几周后，经营困难的石油勘探企业华荣能源(Huarong Energy)宣布，12家银行债主已同意该公司以股份抵偿总计129亿元人民币（合19亿美元）的贷款。华荣能源的前身是一家造船企业。
To many analysts, that debt-for-equity swap outlined by Huarong in a statement to the Hong Kong stock exchange seemed like a pointless exercise in delaying the inevitable. Surely it was better for banks to cut their losses rather than help a zombie shipbuilder reincarnate itself as a Central Asian petroleum play by acquiring oilfields in Kyrgyzstan’s Fergana valley.
对很多分析师而言，华荣能源在港交所(HKEx)公告中概述的债转股方案看上去像是一种没有意义的尝试，只是为了拖延时间，而无法改变不可避免的结局。对于银行来说，比起帮助一家垂死的造船企业通过收购位于吉尔吉斯斯坦费尔干纳盆地的油田重生为一家中亚石油企业，能够减少损失无疑更好。
Six months later, two state-owned enterprises have unveiled the first state council sanctioned debt-for-equity swaps: Yunnan Tin Group and Wuhan Iron & Steel (Wisco). But neither Yunnan Tin nor Wisco’s swaps bear much resemblance to that outlined by Huarong in its transaction, which is still pending.
六个月后，两家国有企业宣布了头两个获得国务院批准的债转股项目：云南锡业集团(Yunnan Tin Group)和武汉钢铁集团（Wisco，简称：武钢）。但是云南锡业和武钢的债转股项目与华荣此前在公告中概述的计划（目前事情仍未确定）没有太多相似之处。
The key difference is the introduction of middle men — in the form of a fund — that stand between Yunnan Tin and Wisco and bank creditors.
关键区别在于，在云南锡业和武钢与银行债权人之间，引入了中间机构——一支基金。
In the case of Yunnan Tin, investors will be invited to purchase equity stakes in the company through the fund, and the proceeds will be used to pay down Rmb10bn worth of the company’s loans.
就云南锡业而言，投资者将受邀通过该基金购买云南锡业的股份，所筹资金将用于偿还该公司总值100亿元人民币的贷款。
This will help to reduce the group’s leverage by about 15 per cent, according to NSBO Beijing, a research house. That in turn would help avoid the downside of the Huarong scenario, whereby banks that had lent billions of renminbi to a shipbuilder could end up as majority shareholders in an oil company with assets in one of Central Asia’s most volatile regions.
研究机构蓝橡资本中国(NSBO China)表示，这将有助于将该集团的杠杆降低约15%。这反过来有助于避免华荣方案的坏处——向一家造船企业发放了数十亿元贷款的那些银行，到头来可能会成为一家在中亚最动荡的地区之一拥有资产的石油公司的大股东。
This attempt to create third-party demand for equity stakes in indebted companies is one of the main differences between the state council’s current debt-for-equity swap programme and its Rmb1.4tn bailout of the banking sector in the late-1990s. Back then, asset management companies paid banks full-face value for non-performing loans that were worth much less.
试图为负债企业的股份创造第三方需求，是国务院当前债转股项目与上世纪90年代末总值1.4万亿元人民币的银行业纾困计划之间的主要区别之一。当时，几家资产管理公司(AMC)按面值全额支付了远不值那个价格的不良贷款。
Another key difference is that the swaps involve standard rather than non-performing or special-mention loans, which is consistent with the government’s pledge that the programme will not be another “free lunch” for zombie companies. Yingchao Zhang, financial analyst at NSBO, observed in a recent report: “The scheme is not designed to tackle China’s NPL problem but to assist companies in reducing leverage levels.”
另一个关键区别在于此次债转股涉及的是正常贷款、而不是不良贷款或关注贷款(special-mention loan)，这与政府承诺该项目不会成为僵尸企业的“免费午餐”的说法一致。蓝橡资本金融分析师张颖超（音译）在最近一份报告中指出：“该项目并不是为了解决中国的不良贷款问题，而是为了帮助企业降低杠杆水平。”
If such swaps help companies such Yunnan Tin reduce leverage and revive their fortunes, the investors who bet on successful turnrounds will be rewarded.
如果此类债转股项目帮助云南锡业这样的企业降低了杠杆水平并恢复了生机，押注企业出现转机的投资者将得到回报。
They will also bear the risk if the companies fail. Despite provisions that would force Yunnan Tin to buy back investors’ shares if its return targets are not met, the government has said it will not come to investors’ rescue if the group is not able to meet its obligations.
假如企业失败，投资者也将承担风险。尽管按照规定，如果未能达到盈利目标，云南锡业将必须回购投资者持有的股票，但是政府称，如果该集团无法履行义务，政府不会出手搭救投资者。
The scheme is too small to be a panacea for China’s larger debt problem. In its initial phase, it is expected to involve no more than Rmb3tn in debt — compared with the country’s outstanding corporate debt stock of Rmb120tn. In that regard, the debt-for-equity swap programme is just one of many tools in the Chinese government’s regulatory toolbox as it attempts to stabilise overall debt levels.
债转股计划规模太小，不足以成为解决中国庞大债务问题的灵丹妙药。在初始阶段，该计划预计将涉及至多3万亿元人民币的债务——而中国目前未偿还的公司债务总计120万亿元人民币。在这方面，债转股项目只是中国政府在试图稳定整体债务水平时使用的众多监管工具之一。
But it is a useful reminder that when investors and analysts worry about problems in China, chances are the government is even more worried about the same issue.
但它有效地提醒了人们，当投资者和分析师为中国的问题担忧时，中国政府可能更是在为同样的问题心急如焚。
Earlier this year, investor relief that the country’s economic growth had stabilised in the first quarter gave way to concerns that the better than expected performance was simply the product of a reckless surge in credit.
今年早些时候，投资者对第一季度中国经济增长保持稳定的宽慰，被这样一种担忧所取代，即强于预期的经济表现只是不计后果的信贷激增的产物。
While the Chinese government has always prioritised economic growth and urban job creation over debt reduction, the complex debt-for-equity swap mechanism revealed in October makes it clear that regulators devoted a lot of time to the problem this summer.
尽管中国政府总是把经济增长和城市就业放在比削减债务优先考虑的位置上，但是10月公布的复杂的债转股机制明确表明，监管部门在今年夏天花了大量时间来研究这个问题。
For all the limitations of such swaps, they at least constitute an official recognition that Chinese corporate debt levels need to be stabilised, if not reduced. Coming on the heels of an unprecedented credit bubble, that in itself is a welcome development.
尽管此类债转股项目存在种种局限性，但是它们至少体现出官方承认了这一点，即需要采取措施稳定、乃至削减中国的公司债水平。在一场前所未有的信贷泡沫之后，这本身就是一种可喜的动向。
