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The spending spree has raised concerns among some overseas lenders about overall borrowing levels.
该集团的收购狂欢引起了一些海外银行对其整体债务水平的担忧。
We don’t understand where HNA’s money is coming from, says a senior foreign banker in China, whose credit committee colleagues are wary of lending to HNA.
我们不明白海航集团的钱是从哪来的，一名常驻中国的外国资深银行人士表示，
They are spending a lot and investing in a lot of things.
他在信贷委员会的同事对向海航集团放贷很谨慎，他们花钱很多，投资也很多。
But it’s too much leverage.
但是杠杆太高。
When we don’t understand something we don’t lend.
当我们看不明白一些事时，我们不会发放贷款。
But one HNA adviser counters: The leverage is definitely high but it’s coming down.
但是海航集团一名顾问反驳道：杠杆高是肯定的，但是已经在下降。
The group realises it overleveraged.
集团意识到杠杆水平太高了。
According to the adviser, HNA’s ratio of debt-to-earnings before interest, tax, deprecation and amortisation at group level was 17 in 2012, 12 in 2015 and will be reduced further this year.
据该顾问表示，2012年整个集团的债务是息税折旧及摊销前利润(EBITDA)的17倍，2015年为12倍，今年还将进一步降低。
Group liquidity rose to $19bn in the first half of this year, boosted by several capital raisings by its Chinese-listed entities.
由于该集团旗下中国上市公司的几次融资，今年上半年海航集团的流动性资金增至190亿美元。
A rights issue by Hainan Airlines cut its gearing — borrowings as a percentage of equity — from 207 per cent to 150 per cent.
海南航空的一次增发将其负债权益比率——负债与权益之比——从207%降低至150%。
Gearing also declined from 359 per cent to 280 per cent at the group’s infrastructure investment arm after a restructuring.
在一次重组后，海航集团的基础设施投资部门的负债权益比率也从359%下降至280%。
Chinese banks appear to have fewer concerns.
中国的银行似乎没那么担忧。
In May, China Construction Bank agreed to provide a Rmb30bn line of credit to HNA.
5月，中国建设银行(CCB)同意向海航集团提供300亿元人民币的授信额度。
In a statement at the time, the group said that various banks have provided credit facilities of over Rmb530bn.
在当时发表的声明中，该集团称多家银行对海航集团的总授信额度已超过5300亿元。
HNA has over-invested before.
海航集团此前也曾投资过度。
The global aviation slump after the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001, exacerbated by the spread of the Sars virus across Asia two years later, inspired it to diversify into shipping.
2001年9.11恐袭后，全球航空业陷入低迷，两年后亚洲爆发的非典疫情使形势进一步恶化，这激发该集团向货运领域多元化拓展。
HNA amassed a number of shipyards and a fleet of 97 vessels, both chartered and owned.
海航集团拥有了多家造船厂，并建起了一支由97艘租赁和自有船只组成的船队。
Soon after that the industry entered a deep downturn, which forced HNA to shed many of its acquisitions.
随后，该行业很快进入了深度衰退，这迫使海航集团将收购的许多资产出手。
At the centre of the storm was China Grand Logistics,
处于风暴中心的是大新华物流(Grand China Logistics)。
a heavily indebted HNA subsidiary that was the owner of China’s first domestically operated cruise ship.
它是海航集团旗下一家负债累累的子公司，拥有中国首艘国内运营的邮轮。
Its financial difficulties spilled into the open in 2013 when a rival Chinese company asked South Korean authorities to impound the MS Henna on Jeju island.
2013年，大新华物流的财务困难问题公开，当时与之竞争的一家中国企业要求韩国政府在济州岛扣押海娜号(MS Henna)。
HNA had to deploy jets to repatriate the 1,600 passengers on board.
海航集团不得不派出飞机将船上1600名乘客接回国。
HNA Cruises suspended operations in 2015 and the Henna was sold for scrap in June.
2015年，海航邮轮(HNA Cruises)停止运营，海娜号今年6月拟出售拆解。
They got heavily into bulk carriers and charter ships, says a Hong Kong-based shipping executive who has dealt with HNA.
他们在散装货船和船舶租赁上投入太大，一名驻香港、与海航集团打过交道的航运高管称，
They’d crowd into things, grew too big too fast and in the end they got caught.
他们一拥而上，发展太快，规模过大，最终被套牢。
They got caught big because they went in big.
被深深套牢就是因为他们做太大了。
