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If yesterday’s devaluation of the renminbi was China’s entry to the currency wars, it brought a knife to a gunfight. The currency fell 1.9 per cent against the dollar, which is the biggest daily fall since 1994 but barely makes a scratch in its rise of a fifth against both the yen and the euro since last summer.
如果昨日的人民币贬值表明中国进入货币战，那么这一举动无异于拿着匕首参加枪战。人民币兑美元中间价贬值1.9%，为自1994年以来的最大单日跌幅，但与自去年夏以来人民币对日元与欧元20%的升幅相比，显得微不足道。
Traders are probably wrong to expect a series of government devaluations. People’s Bank of China policymakers may be part of a repressive autocracy, but they are not stupid: they know devaluations should be big one-off events, not a run of small cuts which encourage capital flight.
交易员如果预期中国政府会让人民币连续贬值，他们很可能会犯错。中国央行的政策制定者或许是压制性专制体制的一部分，但他们绝不愚蠢：他们清楚，贬值应该是较大幅的一次性举动，而不是连续多次小幅贬值，否则会导致资本外逃。
Still, there is fear in the markets that further devaluation is on the way, exporting deflation. Doubt was even cast on US rate rises, with two-year US bond yields yesterday up all of last week’s increase.
尽管如此，市场仍担心未来人民币会继续贬值，向世界输出通缩。随着昨日两年期美国国债收益率抹去了上周的全部涨幅，就连美国的加息前景也打了问号。
The freely traded offshore renminbi dropped 2.8 per cent, while the offshore 12-month forwards fell by double the domestic move, anticipating further weakness ahead.
自由交易的离岸人民币汇率下跌了2.8%，离岸12个月远期汇率跌幅达在岸跌幅的两倍，表明市场预期人民币会进一步走弱。
It is easy to see why China might want to unleash the monetary gunboats. The real value of the renminbi against China’s trading partners is up 14 per cent since last summer, more than the rise in the US dollar. The real renminbi has been accelerating, too, with the fastest year-on-year rise since the recovery began in 2009.
不难看出为何中国或许想要发动“货币炮艇”。自去年夏以来，人民币对中国各贸易伙伴国货币的真实价值累计上升了14%，高于美元的升幅。实际人民币汇率也一直在加速上升，年同比升速达到自2009年复苏开始以来的最高值。
Rather than resort to PBoC devaluations, though, China may finally be taking the US approach and leaving it to the market. A weaker economy, a share price crash and looser monetary policy this year all justify a weaker renminbi, but in nominal terms the currency started this week barely changed against the dollar from the start of January. Aligning the daily fix more closely to the market exchange rate, as the PBoC said it planned, should allow supply and demand to determine the price. Conveniently for the PBoC, at the moment that means a weaker renminbi.
不过，中国最终或许不会再依靠央行来实施贬值，而是采取美国的做法，让市场来决定汇率。今年，中国的经济放缓、股价下跌以及货币宽松，都表明了人民币走弱的合理性，但本周初的人民币兑美元名义汇率与1月初的水平几乎没有变化。将汇率中间价调整至更接近市场汇率的水平——中国央行表示这是他们的计划——应该会使供求成为汇率的决定因素。在中国央行看来，当前的供求状况正好意味着人民币走弱。
Sentiment towards China is currently very negative, but it swings around. The real test of the PBoC’s commitment to a more freely floating currency will be what happens when market moves interfere with its policies.
眼下市场对中国的情绪非常负面，但它不会一直这样。对于中国央行提高人民币汇率自由浮动程度的承诺，真正的考验将是，当市场走势与其政策相左时会发生什么。
It is tough to distinguish a currency war from central bank responses to slow global growth. However defined, a slowing China is right to want a weaker renminbi.
我们很难把货币战跟央行针对全球经济增长缓慢的应对措施区分开来。但无论怎样定义，经济放缓的中国希望人民币走软，都是合乎情理的。
