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In June and December last year, China’s interbank interest rates jumped from their normal level of about 3 per cent to peak as high as 9 per cent a year. The shockwaves did not stop there. Banks scrambled for deposits and pushed up interest rates on their wealth management products. Funding costs in the vast shadow banking sector also moved up, while stocks and bonds suffered falls.
去年6月和12月，中国银行间拆借利率从3%左右的正常水平，飙升至9%的高点。利率飙升的冲击并未就此止步。银行拼命争夺存款，并推高了其理财产品的收益率。规模庞大的影子银行体系中的融资成本也在走高，而股票和债券则出现下跌。
Observers at home and abroad expressed concern about bad debts and the fragility of the banking industry. Some even called it China’s “Minsky moment” – a term coined during the Russian debt crisis of 1998 to describe the turmoil that arises when overstretched investors must finally repay their debts. Some fear that tighter credit markets could cause asset prices to collapse and precipitate a meltdown of the banking industry. But as someone who worked at China’s central bank in the 1980s, I am encouraged by the government’s willingness to tackle the country’s 35-year addiction to cheap credit.
国内外的观察家们对中国银行体系的坏账问题以及脆弱性表示担忧。有人甚至将此称为中国的“明斯基时刻”(Minsky moment)——该词源于1998年的俄罗斯债务危机，用于形容过度负债的投资者最终必须偿付债务时所导致的市场动荡。一些人担心，信贷市场收紧可能导致资产价格崩盘，并加速银行系统的崩溃。我曾于上世纪八十年代在中国央行工作过，因此对中国政府愿意解决35年来依赖廉价信贷发展的问题深感振奋。
Central banks are usually thought of as lenders of last resort. But in the 1980s and 1990s, the People’s Bank of China was the first port of call for banks whose lending ambitions were larger than their deposit bases could sustain.
中央银行通常被认为是最终贷款人。但在二十世纪八、九十年代，对于贷款意愿超过自身存款基础所能支撑规模的银行来说，中国央行(People’s Bank of China)却成为它们的最初贷款人。
I participated in the banks’ bargaining, not just in the loan quota-setting sessions that took place at the beginning of each year but also in ad hoc negotiations that unfolded in smoky boardrooms. It was a common scene in the dark and narrow corridors of the People’s Bank: a mayor or a governor from some province would sit patiently, sometimes for hours, waiting for an opportunity to lobby my senior colleagues for a bigger loan ration for banks in his province or city. Even junior officers such as me found ourselves on the receiving end of their entreaties – and freebies.
我参与了银行与央行当时的讨价还价过程，不仅仅是在每年年初划定贷款配额的环节，还包括在烟雾缭绕的会议室里展开的临时协商。在中国央行阴暗狭窄的走廊里，如下场景非常常见：来自某个省份的市长或者省长耐心地坐在那里等待（有时候要等上好几个小时），以求得到一个机会游说我的那些级别较高的同事，从而为其所在省份或城市争取较高的贷款配额。即便是像我这样的小兵也成了他们恳求的对象，并能因此收到免费的礼物。
Instead of lending out 60 or 70 per cent of their deposits, the banks would lend out more than 100 per cent. The extra money came from the central bank’s printing press.
这些银行并非仅将60%或70%的存款用于放贷，其贷存比甚至超过了100%。多出的资金来源于央行的印钞机。
Official data show that the banking sector’s loan-to-deposit ratios had been well above 100 per cent for a few decades until the mid-1990s. Since then, the central bank has forced down loan-to-deposit ratios. But the flow of easy money has not ended. In fact, it has swelled.
官方数据显示，在上世纪九十年代中期以前的几十年里，中国银行体系的贷存比持续保持在远高于100%的水平。自那以后，中国央行被迫压低银行的贷存比。但低成本资金流并未就此断流。实际上，其规模甚至有所扩大。
In part, that is because the reduction of the loan-to-deposit ratio was more than offset by the recapitalisation of the banking system with the creation of four
部分原因在于，银行体系的资本重组大大抵消了贷存比降低的影响。在资本重组的过程中诞生了四家所谓的“坏账银行”。这使得银行能够继续发放新的贷款。新增贷款一旦被借款方存入银行账户，就又会增加储蓄并为进一步放贷铺平道路。
so-called “bad banks”. This enabled lenders to extend new loans, which, once placed in borrowers’ bank accounts, lifted deposits and made way for yet more lending.
16家大型银行公开发行上市以及后续的配股融资，为银行进一步提供了资金来源。结果是，1999年至2000年度银行整体信贷增长约8%，但从那以后到现在的年均复合增长率达到17%左右。
A further source of capital was provided by the public listings of the 16 largest banks, together with subsequent share placements. As a result, total credit growth accelerated from roughly 8 per cent in 1999-2000 to a compound annual rate of about 17 per cent since then.
如今银行扩张信贷面临三大主要限制：高达20%的存款准备金率（远高于任何其他主要经济体）；75%的贷存比上限；以及每家银行的信贷配额限制。这共同反映出监管当局当前的谨慎态度。
Today there are three major restrictions on the banks’ credit expansion: the very high reserve requirement ratio of 20 per cent
但这道防线现在已有了漏洞。银行通过发售“理财产品”轻易地绕过了这些限制。理财产品的部分功能与储蓄存款相同。银行对央行的游说力度丝毫不见减少。2012年，我发现自己在为一家地区性银行辩护。坐在我对面的是我在央行的前同事们，这让我感到很不舒服。
(far higher than in any other major economy); the 75 per cent cap on the loan-to-deposit ratio; and credit quotas for each bank. It all adds up to a picture of regulatory prudence.
近期的利率飙升远谈不上前所未有。在二十世纪八、九十年代，过度放贷的银行经常会发现自己没有资金应对储户的取现需求。但当时并未在社会上引起恐慌，因为媒体从不报道此类事件，那时也没有银行间市场。
The bucket is leaking, however. The banks have easily circumvented these restrictions by selling “wealth management products” that serve some of the same purposes as deposits. And their lobbying efforts continue unabated. In 2012 I found myself advocating on behalf of a regional lender. Sitting opposite me were my former colleagues from the central bank, and I felt very uncomfortable.
中国央行会以提供紧急贷款的形式介入干预。这种做法已经变得司空见惯，以至于一些银行开始有意运用这一伎俩，将其变成从央行获取更多贷款的常规操作。虽然央行会对银行的不当行为略施惩罚，但这几乎无法阻止它们再次违规。银行家和地方官员会开玩笑地说：“正是这种不痛不痒的惩戒带来的刺激感才导致他们违规的”。
The recent interest rate jumps were far from unprecedented. In the 1980s and 1990s, overstretched banks regularly found themselves without money to meet withdrawals. There was no panic at the time, as the media never reported these things and there was no interbank market.
上世纪八十年代初以来银行贷款快速增长，再加上宽松的放贷标准，导致到了上世纪九十年代末期，不良贷款在银行贷款资产中所占比重达到了30%-40%。如今中国央行正在采取严厉措施防止这种局面重演。银行业的游戏规则有望随着时间推移而改变。
The central bank stepped in to provide emergency loans. These had become commonplace, and some banks began deliberately using the tactic as a matter of routine, to extract more loans from the central bank. Although the banks would receive a slap on the wrist in punishment for their misbehaviour, this did little to deter repeat offenders. Bankers and local politicians would jokingly say: “The thrill justifies the sin.”
中国需要更高的利率水平，来给房地产市场泡沫降温，缩减浪费性的投资，并尽可能地降低普通储户对银行的补贴。中国政府仍然不愿让信贷市场完全自由化。但即便政府尚未出手，市场力量已经开始推高利率水平。
