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After the 2008 financial crisis, banks initially acted like a cartoon character who shoots over a cliff-edge at high speed and keeps going for a while before falling. Five years on, they are lying on the ground – and will never be allowed to return to their fast-paced ways.
2008年金融危机之后，最初银行就像卡通中的人物一样，以很快的速度冲向悬崖边，在摔下去之前还向前滑了一段距离。五年过后，他们依然躺在地上，也将永远被禁止像过去那样狂奔疾跑。
It has taken a long time for the authorities on both sides of the Atlantic to address some of the deep-seated problems that contributed to the crisis. But they are now doing so, despite all the lobbying and protests. Few bankers have gone to jail, but the industry is being disciplined.
大西洋两岸当局花了很长时间才着手解决导致危机的一些深层次问题。现在他们就在这么做，尽管面临许多游说和抗议。几乎没有银行家入狱，但这个行业正在受到整肃。
This week brought two announcements that strike at the distortions caused to banking by cheap credit and the underpricing of risk over past decades. One was the Federal Reserve’s decision to implement the Basel III capital rules, and to add extra measures. The other was the European Commission’s assault on how banks trade credit derivatives.
近期出了两条政策，矛头指向近几十年来低息信贷和风险定价过低在银行业造成的扭曲现象。一个是美联储决定执行“巴塞尔III”资本规定，还采取额外措施。另一个就是欧盟委员会(EC)对银行的信用衍生品交易方式开刀。
These measures sound technical, and lack the populist appeal of EU efforts to limit bonuses or impose a financial transactions tax. Yet both will have fundamental effects on how banks operate, and how likely they are to fail again in a crisis. They will not only make banking less profitable, but also less volatile.
这些措施比较具有技术性，与欧盟限制奖金或者征收金融交易税的努力相比，缺乏民粹吸引力。然而，对于银行如何运营、有多大可能再次在危机中陷落，这两个方面有着根本性的影响。它们不仅会削弱银行盈利性，也会让银行变得更稳定。
It is notable that, both for banks’ capital requirements, and the move from derivatives being traded over-the-counter among banks to trading on exchanges and settling within clearing houses, the industry’s rearguard action has failed. The reforms being imposed after periods of consultation and review are little changed from the originals.
有一点值得注意，不论在银行资本要求方面，还是让银行间的衍生品场外交易转入交易所交易并在结算所结算的做法，银行业的“后卫”行动都是失败的。征求意见和审核期之后所实施的改革与最初并没有多大不同。
Jamie Dimon, chairman and chief executive of JPMorgan Chase, once described Basel III as “anti-American” but the Fed has taken the Swiss approach of adding to its penalties, rather than subtracting. Gary Gensler, the chairman of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, has energetically forced through US derivatives reforms in the teeth of lawsuits.
摩根大通(JPMorgan Chase)董事长兼首席执行官杰米•戴蒙(Jamie Dimon)曾说巴塞尔III是“反美国”的，但美联储(Fed)却采取了瑞士的方法，增加而不是减少惩罚力度。美国商品期货交易委员会(Commodity Futures Trading Commission)主席盖瑞•杰斯勒(Gary Gensler)顶着法律诉讼的压力一直在积极推进美国衍生品改革。
The EU has passed laws that will implement similar changes to swaps trading – making it more transparent and safer by pushing trades through clearing houses. The European Commission’s antitrust action against investment banks, which fought off incursions by exchanges into their over-the-counter market, fits with this.
欧盟已经通过法律，将对掉期交易实施类似改革——让交易通过结算所进行结算，使其更加透明和安全。欧盟委员会针对投资银行（后者击退了交易所对他们的场外市场的入侵）的反垄断行动就符合这一目标。
Such initiatives address one of the biggest weaknesses exposed by the 2008 crisis – over-the-counter trading of credit default swaps without an adequate capital cushion contributed to the near-collapse of American International Group. More broadly, banks held too little capital for the risks they were unwittingly taking, as many discovered.
这些举措触及了2008年金融危机暴露出来的一大弱点：在没有足够资本缓冲情况下进行的场外信用违约掉期(CDS)交易，正是这种做法导致美国国际集团(American International Group)陷于崩溃边缘。更广泛地来看，很多人都发现，银行用来应对意外风险的资金过少。
The chief task after 2008 was to remedy this, and the fact that the reforms are now falling into place is welcome. Despite Mr Gensler’s fear that other countries will exploit his reforms by luring dealers to less regulated spots, the US and Europe have matched each other. Europe lags behind the US in swaps reform but is on the same path.
2008年之后的主要任务就是弥补这点，而改革措施正在逐渐落实的事实令人欣慰。尽管杰斯勒担忧其他国家会利用他的改革措施，将交易商“引诱”到监管较松的地方，但美国和欧洲是差不多的。在掉期交易改革中，欧洲落后于美国，但却走在同样的道路上。
Since changes to capital and to margin requirements – a crucial part of derivatives reforms – occur deep within banks’ operations, it is easy to miss their impact. But they affect each transaction a bank undertakes with a customer.
由于资本金和保证金要求（衍生品改革的一个关键部分）的变化发生在银行运营的较深层面，很容易就会忽略它们的影响。但它们影响着银行与客户的每一笔交易。
Take the market in credit default swaps, which developed in the 1990s as a means for banks to offset credit risk, and is the target of European antitrust action. Until recently, it was an over-the-counter market controlled by banks, in which deals were done privately and banks did not have to post collateral, as swaps dealers must on exchanges.
以上世纪九十年代发展起来的信用违约掉期市场为例，信用违约掉期是银行抵消信用风险的一种方式，该市场也是欧洲反垄断行动的目标。之前，它一直都是银行控制的一个场外交易市场，在这个市场上，银行私下完成交易，不需要像掉期交易商在交易所那样必须提供担保。
If Megabank had been doing a lot of business with ABC Corporation and was near its credit limit, it could clear its balance sheet by writing a swap with Minorbank. Minorbank would take on the existing ABC risk for a hefty fee, and Megabank could carry on as before. The cost of the swap was high, but it paid for itself by releasing capital.
假设Megabank与ABC公司有大量业务往来，并且接近其信贷限额，就可以通过与Minorbank的掉期协议来清理其资产负债表。Minorbank会收取很高的费用来承担与ABC相关风险。而Megabank则照常运营。掉期的成本很高，但它会释放出资本。
Until 2008, this worked nicely for everyone. ABC kept being allocated cheap credit, while Minorbank’s traders got bonuses at the end of the year from the swap fees (and later returned the favour to their mates at Megabank). Banks shared out their excess profits from underpriced credit among the shareholders, customers and traders.
2008年之前，这么做对每个人来说都很顺利。ABC一直都能获得低息信贷，而Minorbank的交易员则从掉期费用中获得年终奖（之后也会回报Megabank的同仁）。银行在股东、客户、交易员之间分配低价信贷带来的超额收益。
Then they ran off the cliff.
之后他们就集体掉下悬崖。
In the new world of higher capital charges, central clearing, exchange-traded futures and a crackdown on anything that smacks of big banks colluding, things are tougher. Banks will need to put aside more capital against deals and cannot reap similarly juicy profits.
在资本成本上升、实行中央结算方式、相关期货在交易所交易，以及遏制一切有大银行“勾结”嫌疑操作的新世界，形势变得更加艰难。银行需要留出更多资金，并且无法获得像以前一样的丰厚收益。
For the health and durability of the system, that is a considerable benefit. The fact that dealers have to pass trades through clearing houses and post margin makes it less likely that the AIG failure will be repeated. If banks hold more capital, taxpayers won’t need to rescue them.
这对整个银行体系的健康和持久发展大为有利。交易商必须通过结算所来完成交易并提交保证金，使得AIG式的失败重演的可能性降低。如果银行有更多的资本金，纳税人就不需要拯救它们。
It isn’t cost-free. Joaquín Almunia, the EU competition commissioner, is right that exchange-trading of swaps should be cheaper for investors than the banks’ over-the-counter market, all other things being equal. As it becomes more expensive for banks to arrange swaps, however, they will inevitably pass on some of these regulatory costs to their customers.
这么做也是有代价的。欧盟竞争委员会专员杰奎因•阿尔穆尼亚(Joaquín Almunia)说得对，在其他方面对等的情况下，对投资者来说，交易所掉期交易的成本应该低于银行的场外交易市场。然而，随着银行安排掉期交易的费用增加，他们将不可避免地将一些监管成本转移给客户。
“A product that a bank could customise and was almost free is becoming standardised and very expensive,” says Will Rhode, head of fixed income at Tabb Group, a consultant. Volumes of credit default swaps have fallen sharply as banks becomes swaps dealers.
咨询公司Tabb集团固定收益业务主管威尔•罗德(Will Rhode)说：“银行过去可以定制设计并近乎免费的产品如今正在成为标准化产品，并且非常昂贵。”银行成为掉期交易商之后，信用违约掉期的数量就大幅下降。
This is the price society and the financial system pays for lessening risks and promoting stability. It was never going to be easy to reform bad banking habits acquired over decades but, several years after the crash, banks are facing the inevitable regulatory reckoning.
这是社会和金融体系为降低风险、提升稳定性所付出的代价。银行业几十年来形成的糟糕习惯很难改革，但在危机的几年之后，银行正面临不可避免的监管算账。
