Western Europe is not the limit of this: the panic has also struck banks in Hong Kong, Russia and now India. And it is not just the geographical breadth of this crisis that is alarming, but also its economic depth. Because it is rooted in the money markets (see article and article), it will feed through to businesses and households in every economy it hits.
如此的境况不仅限于西欧：包括香港、俄罗斯和印度等国都陷入恐慌中。此次危机所预警的并不仅仅是地域的宽度，还包含经济层面的深度。由于根源于金融市场，它必将直接影响到所有受打击经济中的企业和家庭。

Take a deep breath
深吸一口气，做好准备

Most of the time nobody notices the credit flowing through the lungs of the economy, any more than people notice the air they breathe. But everyone knows when credit stops circulating freely through markets to banks, businesses and consumers. For almost a year the markets had worried about banks’ liquidity and solvency. After the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers last month, amid confusion about whom the state would save and on what terms, they panicked. The markets for three-, six- and 12-month paper are shut, so banks must borrow even more money overnight than usual.
大多数时间没有人会留意到流通在经济中的信贷，一如没有什么人会留意他们呼吸的空气；但是当信贷无法自由的通过市场循环到银行、企业和消费者的时候，每个 人都觉察到了问题。在过去几乎一年的时间里，市场一直为银行的流动性和清偿能力而忧虑。上个月雷曼兄弟倒下后，由于对政府会以什么样的条件救助什么样的银 行充满困惑，市场完全恐慌了。于是季度、半年和一年期的票据市场完全关闭了，这就意味着银行必须在短时间内比以往筹集到更多的现金。

Banks used to borrow from each other at about 0.08 percentage points above official rates; on September 30th they paid more than four percentage points more. In one auction to get dollar funds overnight from the European Central Bank, banks were prepared to pay interest of 11%, five times the pre-crisis rate. Astonishingly, rates scaled these extremes even as the Federal Reserve promised $620 billion of extra funding.
银行间过去以高于（低于）官 方利率十万分之八的利率进行同业拆借；而9月30日他们却要多付百分之四。一次为了在短时间内从欧洲央行得到美元基金进行的竞拍中，银行甚至准备以11% 的利率出价，这相当于危机前5倍的价格。令人震惊的是，在联储承诺6200亿美元的额外基金后，利率仍然朝着这种极端攀升。

Bankers have always earned their crust by committing money for long periods and financing that with short-term deposits and borrowing. Today, that model has warped into self-parody: many of the banks’ assets are unsellable even as they have to return to the market each day to ask for lenders to vote on their survival. No wonder they are hoarding cash.
银行通常用短期储蓄和借贷来满足资金需求，并通过这种运作形成积累；如今这种模式已经扭曲成了滑稽的自我模仿：很多银行资产都没有销路，正如他们每天都必须回到市场上央求贷款者帮助他们存活下去。无疑他们需要储蓄现金。

This is why those politicians who set the interests of Main Street against those of Wall Street are so wrong. Sooner or later the money markets affect every business. Companies face higher interest charges and the fear that they may one day lose access to bank loans altogether. So they, too, hoard cash, cancelling acquisitions and investments, in order to pay down debt. Managers delay new products, leave factories unbuilt, pull the plug on loss-making divisions, and cut costs and jobs. Carmakers and other manufacturers will no longer extend credit (see article) and loans will become elusive and expensive. Consumers will suffer. Unemployment will rise. Even if the credit markets work well, the rich economies will slow as the asset-price bubble pops. If credit is choked off, that slowdown could turn into a deep recession.
这就是那些政客为了小企业利益而牺牲大公司想法的错误所在：金融市场早晚会影响到所有的企业。那些承受高利率成本的公司也惧怕某天他们会无法从银行得到贷款，于是他们也开始储备现金，为了减少负债甚至取消了收购和投资；管理层 停止新品推出，暂缓工厂扩建，关闭不盈利机构，削减成本以及进行裁员；汽车及其它制造商不再延长消费信用，贷款销售将变得难得并且昂贵；最终受罪的是消费 者，失业率必将上升。即使信贷市场运转正常，发达国家的经济发展也会由于资产价格泡沫的破裂而放缓；如果信贷市场阻塞，那么经济的放缓将会发展成深度经济 萧条。

Financial markets need governments to set rules for them; and when markets fail, governments are often best placed to get them going again. That’s pragmatism, not socialism. Helping bankers is not an end in itself. If the government could save the credit markets without bailing out the bankers, it should do so. But it cannot. Main Street needs Wall Street; and both need Washington. Politicians—and President George Bush is the most culpable among them (see article)—have failed to explain this.
金融市场需要政府来设定规则；当市场失败的时候，政府常常已经准备好了使之继续前行：这是使用主义，不是社会主义。对银行的救助不是最终目的，如果政府不 救助银行就能挽救信贷市场，那么他应该这样做；但是他却无法实现这个目的。小企业也需要大公司，他们都需要政府。政客们没有阐明这一点，而布什总统是他们 中最应受到责备的。

Governments need not just to communicate, but also to co-ordinate. Past banking crises show that late, piecemeal rescues cost more and work less well. Ad hoc mergers work for a while, but demands for help tend to recur. Inconsistency sows uncertainty. Cross-border banking can make one country’s policies awkward for the neighbours: the Irish government’s guarantee of all deposits threatens to suck in money from poorly protected British banks. France’s suggestion on October 1st that Europe’s governments should work together was a good one; Germany’s rejection of it was wrong.
政府需要做的不仅仅是沟通，还有协调。过往的银行危机证明了迟到而零散的救助不仅成本更高，而且效果更差。临时整合短时间内有效，但是需要持续才能有效。矛盾必然传播不确定性结果。跨国银行可以让一国政策威胁到邻国：爱尔兰政府通过从保护措施少的可怜的英国银行吸纳现金来确保自己的存款不受威胁；法国在10月1日建议欧盟各国政府应该齐心协力，而德国政府对此表示出的反对是不正确的。

Central banks have co-ordinated their liquidity operations. Now that oil prices have plunged and worries about inflation are receding, interest-rate cuts are possible. They would be more powerful if co-ordinated. But it is not only central banks that need to combine. Whatever America’s Congress does, governments should work together on principles to stabilise and recapitalise banks—not just to stem panic but also to save money. Even if, as the Europeans claim, the crisis was made in America, it now belongs to everyone.
央行已经协调他们的流动性部门。目前油价下跌，通胀的 忧虑也有所减轻，削减利率的可能性加大。相互协调的能量会更大，但需要团结在一起的不光是央行。不管美国国会的意思如何，政府都应该以稳定和向银行注资为 原则而共同努力，不光为了消除恐慌，更是为了拯救经济。即使像欧洲人宣称的那样，危机源于美国，但现在已经是每一个人的问题了。