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On the morning of september 11, 2001, Sater was still working at Bayrock and making his normal morning commute into Manhattan.
2001年11月的一个早上，仍在贝罗克集团工作的萨特像往常一样通勤去曼哈顿。
But when he neared the Midtown Tunnel, he saw it: The twin towers of the World Trade Center had been hit by planes, one after the other.
但在中城隧道附近，他看到世贸中心的双子塔遭到飞机接连袭击。
Sater doesn't remember exactly when he realized bin Laden was responsible for the carnage.
萨特不记得是什么时候意识到本·拉登就是这场屠杀的始作俑者。
But once he did, he says, his mind raced back to his time in Moscow,
但是萨特说，他一想到这件事，他的思绪就回到了莫斯科的日子，
when he was funneling information to the U.S. government.
那段时间他向美国政府传递信息。
One bizarre episode stood out, he claims:
他还讲了一段不容忽视的离奇经历：
In the spring of 1998, he, E and about 15 or 20 ex–Soviet special forces fighters went to Dushanbe, the capital of Tajikistan,
1998年春，萨特、E和约15到20名前苏联特种部队战士前往塔吉克斯坦首都杜尚别，
a former Soviet republic that borders Afghanistan.
塔吉克斯坦与阿富汗接壤，曾属于前苏联。
They had information from Hamid's sources in the Northern Alliance about bin Laden's location—a camp in the mountain range called Tora Bora.
他们从哈米德在北方联盟的线人那里得得知本·拉登的位置信息——一托拉博拉山脉的一个营地。
Hamid had proved his bona fides,
哈米德已经证明其诚意，
so "we had no reason to doubt what he was telling us," Sater claims.
所以“我们没有理由怀疑消息的真实性，”萨特声称。
And E and his men were going to try to take out bin Laden—for a price.
为了钱，E和他带的人准备试着干掉本·拉登。
They drove from Dushanbe across the border to Mazar-i-Sharif,
他们从杜尚别开车穿过塔吉克斯坦的边界，来到阿富汗的马扎里沙里夫，
where they rendezvoused with Northern Alliance fighters.
与北方联盟的战士会和。
Sater claims he called Langley,
萨特称他电话联系了中情局总部，
saying he had real intelligence about bin Laden's whereabouts and soldiers who were willing to move on the camp.
说明自己掌握了关于本·拉登下落，以及想离开本·拉登营地士兵的真实情报。
What he needed to know was how much the agency would pay.
他要知道中情局会为此付多少钱。
"Greed was always my go-to weapon," Sater says.
“贪婪是我可靠的武器，”萨特说。
Getting E into potentially lucrative telecom deals,
让E参与可能有利可图的电信交易，
as well as Sater's background as a Russian-speaking former Wall Street guy,
以及萨特自己曾以俄裔身份在华尔街工作的背景，
had cemented his relationship with the former military intelligence officer.
都巩固了萨特与这位前苏联军事情报官员E的关系。
The CIA, Sater says, told him the bounty on bin Laden was $5 million.
据萨特称，中情局告诉他抓住本·拉登的奖励是500万美元。
He claims he told the agency that wasn't going to cut it:
萨特告诉中情局这根本不够本:
"These guys were walking into a potential bloodbath.
“这些人正在搞一起极有可能发生的大屠杀。
There were about 50 of (them) total.
总共约有50人。
They needed at least a million dollars each."
每人至少需要100万美元。”
The CIA balked, Sater claims, and the group retreated to Dushanbe, then back to Moscow.
中情局不同意，所以他们退到杜尚别，之后又返回莫斯科。
(Three former CIA officials declined to either confirm or deny this account.
（三名前中情局官员拒绝证实或否认这一说法。
Hamid couldn't be reached for comment.)
记者无法联系到哈米德置评。）
As bin Laden's face became a permanent fixture in the papers and on the news,
当本拉登的脸频频出现在报纸和新闻广播上时，
Sater couldn't shake the thought out of his mind:
萨特脑子里有一个移不开的念头：
"Could we have had him? Was that a possibility? I'll never know."
“我们本来能抓住本·拉登吗？有这个可能吗？我无从知晓。”
Not long after the 9/11 attacks, the FBI again reached out to Sater.
在9·11恐怖袭击事件发生后不久，中情局再次联系了萨特。
Only this time the bureau wanted him to get in touch with Hamid—and help with counterterrorism—not the mob.
只有这次中情局才想让萨特联系哈米德，并协助反恐行动，而不是去抓恐怖分子。
The American informant did what the bureau asked, and he knew what to expect from the Afghan.
萨特这位美国情报人员照做了，他知道阿富汗将会发生什么。
"What's in it for me?" Hamid asked.
“我从终会得到什么？”哈米德问道。
He "didn't give a damn about Americans," Sater says.
萨特说哈米德“毫不在意美国人，”
But Al-Qaeda had recently assassinated Ahmad Shah Massoud, the leader of the Northern Alliance,
但是基地组织那时暗杀了北方联盟领袖艾哈迈德·沙赫·马苏德，
so the Afghan said he would help if the money was right.
所以如果酬金够丰厚，哈米德表示愿意协助。
Sater had already given this some thought.
萨特已经考虑过这个问题。
He claims he told Hamid—accurately, as it turned out, but not because he knew anything—that the Americans would soon invade the country.
萨特和哈米德说美国之后会侵入阿富汗，事实确实如此，但这并不是因为他什么都知道。
The Afghan needed more than that.
哈米德想知道更多。
So Sater claims he assured him the U.S. would depose the Taliban and set up a central bank in Kabul.
所以萨特向哈米德保证美国将推翻塔利班，并在喀布尔建立中央银行。
The Afghan, he says, could help run it.
萨特说哈米德可以帮助管理。
This was a complete lie,
这是一个弥天大谎，
but Sater says he sold it by putting together a packet of official-looking legal documents, allegedly from the U.S. government,
但据萨特讲，他拼凑了一套看起来像官方文件的法律文件(据称来自美国政府)，
authorizing the creation of the bank.
文件授权成立银行。
He shipped them and a satellite phone to Hamid, who believed the story, according to Sater.
据萨特所言，他把这些文件和一部卫星电话送到哈米德那里，使得哈米德相信了这一说法。
Soon, the American asset says, before the first CIA paramilitary operators entered Afghanistan, the information started to flow.
对美国极有价值的萨特说，很快，在第一批中央情报局准军事人员进入阿富汗之前，情报开始传递。
It was detailed and specific,
情报详细具体，
and even included locations of Al- Qaeda fighters, weapons
甚至还包括基地组织武装分子的位置、武器
and information about how the 9/11 attackers had financed their operation.
以及9·11恐怖袭击分子如何为恐怖袭击筹集资金。
The way Sater recalls it, a relative of his Afghan informant was married to Taliban leader Mullah Omar's personal secretary,
萨特回忆道，阿富汗线人哈米德的亲戚与塔利班领袖毛拉·奥马尔的私人秘书的结婚了，
and they traveled everywhere together, including to the caves of Tora Bora,
并一起到处旅行，还去了托拉博拉山脉的营地山洞，
where he and bin Laden retreated after the United States invaded.
而这个地方就是这位亲戚和本拉登在美国入侵后撤退的地方。
For Sater, the work was surreal and often gratifying.
对于萨特来说，这个工作离奇而又快意。
"FBI agents would come to my house each night and stay there until 2 or 3 in the morning,"
“联邦调查局的特工每天晚上都到我家来，待到凌晨两三点，”
he says, "drinking my wife's coffee, poring over this stuff."
萨特说，“我妻子做咖啡，我和他们研究这些事。”
(An FBI official who knew Sater at the time said the general outline of this story is accurate but declined to go into specifics.)
（一位了解萨特的联邦调查局官员当时说这个事情的大体框架是准确的，但这位官员拒绝透露更多细节。）
Sater says he has never been paid by any U.S. government agency for his assistance,
萨特说他从未因协助调查收到任何美国政府机构的酬金，
and current and former FBI officials confirm that.
前任及现任联邦调查局官员都证实了此事。
"All this was going on," Sater says,
“一切都持续推进，”萨特说，
"I just remember thinking how crazy it all was.
“我只记得当时我在想，一切都是如此疯狂。
How did I get involved in all this?"
我是怎么卷进来的?”
译文由可可原创，仅供学习交流使用，未经许可请勿转载。
