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It was something we'd seen before,and it was completely unambiguous.
这是我们之前见到过，并且确切不疑。
This was an epidemic of accounting control fraud led by the banks.
这就是银行主导的大面积会计管理欺诈行为。
What about liar's loans?
欺骗性贷款又是神马呢？
Well, that warning actually comes earlier.
实际上，它的预警信号来得更早。
The savings and loan debacle is basically the early 1980s through 1993,and in the midst of fighting that wave of accounting control fraud.
储贷危机基本上从1980年代早期开始持续到1993年，在打击那波会计管理欺诈的行动中，
In 1990, we found that a second front of fraud was being started.
我们在1990年发现欺诈行为出现了第二波。
And like all good financial frauds in America,it began in Orange County, California.
果不其然，和美国的所有牛逼的金融欺诈行为一样，发源地又是加州橙县。
And we happened to be the regional regulators for it.
我们刚好是当地的监管机构。
And our examiners said,they are making loans without even checking what the borrower's income is.
我们的检查人员说，当地银行根本不核实借款人的收入情况直接就发放借款。
This is insane, it has to lead to massive losses,and it only makes sense for entities engaged in these accounting control frauds.
这太没底线了，必然会导致大规模损失，这种情况只可能是金融机构进行了会计管理欺诈行为。
And we said, yeah, you're absolutely right,and we drove those liar's loans out of the industry in 1990 and 1991.
我们对检查人员说，没错，你们说的对，然后就在90、91年，我们在银行业取缔了这些欺诈性的贷款。
But we could only deal with the industry we had jurisdiction over, which was savings and loans,
但是我们只能处理我们有权管理的业务，也就是储蓄和贷款业务。
And so the biggest and the baddest of the frauds, Long Beach Savings, voluntarily gave up its federal savings and loan charter, gave up federal deposit insurance.
业内最大最狡猾的诈骗银行长滩储蓄主动放弃联邦政府颁发的储蓄和借贷执照，放弃联邦存款保险。
Converted to become a mortgage bank for the sole purpose of escaping our jurisdiction,
变身一家抵押银行煞费苦心，只为了逃避我们的监管，
and changed its name to Ameriquest,and became the most notorious of the liar's loans frauds early on.
长滩储蓄后来更名为Ameriquest，是早期欺骗性借贷欺诈行为最为臭名昭著的。
and to add to that,they deliberately predated upon minorities.
此外，他们还故意欺骗美国的少数族裔。
So we knew again about this crisis.
所以这样的诈骗性贷款危机也是我们所了解的，
We'd seen it before. We'd stopped it before.
我们之前见过，我们之前也阻止过。
We had incredibly early warnings of it,and it was absolutely unambiguous that no honest lender would make loans in this fashion.
我们接到的预警信号非常之早，预警信号确切不疑：有节操的借方绝不会这样放款。
So let's take a look at the reaction of the industry and the regulators and the prosecutors to these clear early warnings that could have prevented the crisis.
我们来看看面对这些完全可以阻止危机发生的清晰预警信号，从行业自身、监管机构到检调人员都做了些什么。
Start with the industry.
先看行业本身。
The industry responded between 2003 and 2006 by increasing liar's loans by over 500 percent.
从2003年到2006年，金融行业的欺骗性借贷业务增加了5倍之多。
These were the loans that hyperinflated the bubble and produced the economic crisis.
正是这些贷款使泡沫飞速膨大，造成了经济危机。
By 2006, half of all the loans called subprime were also liar's loans.
截至2006年，半数被称为次贷的借款，同时也是欺骗性借贷。
They're not mutually exclusive, it's just that together,they're the most toxic combination you can possibly imagine.
这两者并不互斥，而是交织在一起共同构成你所能想象出的最坏组合。
